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ABSTRACT: Squeezes are registered occasionally in the forward market for Brent crude oil. 
The squeezer accumulates forward contracts and creates artificial demand by refusing to close 
out, exploiting imperfections in the decentralized market clearing. The artificial demand in 
turn creates a price surge and the possibility of a squeeze thus introduces uncertainty about 
the market outcome. Squeezes therefore render the market institution less pa.atable to other 
market participants (traders and refineries) who may find other ways of accomplishing the 
economic functions of the forward market, so the producers have a long term interest in 
keeping market clearing smooth by supplying stocks to squeezed short. The extent to which 
such self-regulatory stocks should be held is analysed in the context of a repeated game. 
Unless the probability of a squeeze is very small, self-regulation should be possible.
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Oil Stocks as a Squeeze Preventing 
Mechanism:
Is Self-Regulation Possible?
"Comers are, or were, consequences of an excessive freedom of enterprise which seems largely a thing of 
the past in American futures markets. The British grain trade has never permitted either corners or significant squeezes 
in its futures markets. Squeezes continue to occur in American futures markets, though they can and should be 
eliminated." (Working (1949))
0. Introduction
Recently the organised British forward market for crude oil has permitted significant 
squeezes. On the 11th of January. 1988, the Weekly Petroleum Argus (WPA) reported:
"Someone has got a lot of January Brent unsold. The name most frequently mentioned in this connection 
is Transworld Oil [TWO], a Netherlands based trader presided over by the buccaneering John Deuss who also owns 
a refinery in Philadelphia. Who if anyone is behind Mr. Deuss is a matter of speculation and Argus can report only 
that two traders out of three think there is an Arab Gulf state in the background.
The story begins at the end of November when TWO begins to accumulate claims to Brent for January 
lifting. That seemed odd at the time. The Opec ministers were about to meet and it would have been hard to find 
anyone in the oil industry optimistic about the outcome. To take a long position in crude to be lifted after the 
ministers had finished their deliberations appeared foolhardy. (...)
There was a precedent. In April TWO had succeeded in cornering 15-Day Brent for lifting ai the end of the 
month and had collected a premium of up to a dollar and a half over dated crude. That manoeuvre was clearly 
profitable in itself. (...)
When the manoeuvre was repeated in December the major Brent producers. Esso and Shell, let it be known that they 
would do all in their power to frustrate it. Some cargoes were released from their corporate systems and other similar 
North Sea crudes, together with Nigerian, were made available. But they failed to prevent a serious distortion from 
developing in the spectrum of oil prices."
This paper is an attempt to understand the economics of self-regulating duopoly. The 
basic question is whether oligopolistic producers can carry what we shall call "regulatory 
stocks" in order to make sure that a squeezer cannot create artificial scarcity on the spot 
market. The last paragraph of the quotation from the WPA suggests that this type of self­



























































































Let us begin by explaining the jargon used in the quotation1. First of all, "Brent" 
designates Brent Blend, a mixture of the production from seventeen separate oil fields in the 
North Sea. Most of the Arabian oil imported in Europe is priced with reference to the price 
of Brent, which explains why Arab states may have an interest in pushing this price up. Esso 
and Shell, who control the production of Brent, have a long-term interest in keeping the Brent 
market liquid.
On any given day, there are two prices for Brent. The "dated" price is for a cargo that 
is lifted or to be lifted into a vessel on a particular date: the dated price is thus what is called 
the spot price in standard literature. A "15-Day" price is for a "paper" cargo and can be "first 
month" (for delivery on an unspecified date next month), or "second month" (for delivery in 
the second month to come), etcetera. A paper cargo is a claim to 500.000 barrels of Brent to 
be lifted at an unspecified date in a particular month to come. Dates of lifting must be 
determined 15 days in advance2. For April liftings, these dates can thus be determined up to 
the 13th of April1. Consequently, during the first two weeks of April there exists 
simultaneously a 15-Day April price (for still undated April cargoes) and a dated April price.
*  A premium for 15-Day April Brent over dated crude is thus the (positive) difference between 
the price of a paper April cargo and a dated April cargo.
Section 1 gives the evidence on the price distortions that resulted from the April 1987 
and January 1988 squeezes and three subsequent squeezes. The distortions occurred on the 
15-Day forward market and implied huge premia of first month Brent over both second-month 
Brent and first-month West Texas Intermediate (WTI). The latter is an American crude that 
is a substitute for Brent and is traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).
Section 2 sets up a model of a market with a potential squeeze. In Section 2.1 we 
examine the incentive to squeeze and for the producers to prevent the squeeze under the 
assumption that the producers coordinate their effort by setting up regulatory stocks. The 
opposing interests of the players are: Short-term profit to the squeezer against long-term profit
1 Further institutional details about the Brent market can be found in Mabro (1986) and 
Phlips (1992).
2 To give the buyer time to charter a tanker and send it to Sullom Voe (Shetlands) where 
the loading takes place. Hence the name "15-Day market".
1 Since a loading date is in fact a three-day period. With 30 days in the month, the last 




























































































to the producers. The question is whether and to what degree it pays to prevent a squeeze. 
In Section 2.2 we then analyse whether the oligopolists’ decision to keep regulatory stocks 
is any different from the monopolist’s (it is not) and whether this affects the scope for 
cooperation in the repeated game (it does).
Section 3 concludes by pondering why regulatory stocks are not held even though this 
study indicates they should be. The realism of the assumptions of the model is discussed, as 
are variations of the model.
1. Squeezes on the 15-Day Brent Market
This section illustrates the price effects of the two squeezes mentioned in the 




























































































Figure 1 covers the period from 10 March to 15 April 1987 and represents4 the 
premium of first month Brent over second month Brent and the premium of first month Brent 
over first month WTI. From mid-March the premium of first over second month Brent started 
to climb up to $ 0.50. In the first week of April, it suddenly increased to $ 1.60 within 5 
days. That this was due to a squeeze and not to market fundamentals is confirmed by the fact 
that the premium of first month Brent over first month WTI followed the same pattern, 
although WTI is a close substitute to Brent.
How does such a squeeze arise? To close out a position on the 15-Day market, there 
are two possibilities. The first is a "bookout" whereby a number of participants agree to 
cancel their contracts with a cash settlement. These participants have contracts that can be 
arranged in a chain starting and ending with the same participant. A squeezer has never sold 
forward and thus will not appear in a bookout. The contracts that are cleared by a bookout 
are not pertinent to the squeeze.
The second way of closing out a position is to pass on a 15-day notice to take delivery 
along a "daisy chain". The chain starts when a seller with entitlements to Brent serves a 15- 
day notice to take delivery to those who have buying contracts with him for April delivery. 
A buyer who receives such a notice can either accept it or pass it on to somebody who bought 
from him. The squeezer accepts the notice and thus builds up his stock of claims to Brent for 
April lifting.
What happens if a participant cannot close his position? If a participant without 
entitlement to Brent has sold a contract to the squeezer on the forward market and if the 
squeezer refuses to construct a bookout by selling the contract back to the participant, then 
the participant has a legal obligation to deliver Brent to the squeezer in April. The participant 
must buy a cargo on the spot market thereby creating an artificial demand for spot Brent. The 
squeezer has bought an significant amount of the entitlements to April Brent and thus more 
or less controls supply. With an inelastic supply and an artificially increased demand the spot 
price goes up. The other possibility is that the squeezer agrees to sell a paper cargo back to 
the short participant so that a bookout can be arranged. This time the squeezer sets the terms
4 The sources are Platt’s for Brent prices and Nymex for WTI prices. Note that for Brent, 
the months change as of the 10th of any particular month. Until 9 March, the first month is 
March. From 10 March to 9 April, the first month is April, and so on. For WTI, the first 




























































































of the paper trade. This leaves the spot price unchanged but raises the 15-Day price. A 
mixture of these two types of squeezing is of course also a possibility.
The squeeze results from the fact that the market participants (apart from the squeezer) 
on average are net short and the squeezer is very long in the market. In case of a corner, the 
squeezer has complete control over the dated April cargoes, so that the sellers have to buy 
from him at a premium. Implicit in all this is the idea that the integrated producers are not 
willing to supply cargoes from the stocks they hold for refinery (or other) purposes5.
Figure 2: The January 1988 Squeeze 
(10th of December to 15th of January)
In late november 1987, TWO began buying January cargoes at a price at parity or
5 Tax considerations may be involved: individual producers may have preferred to retain 
oil on their hands rather than selling it at arms-length at a higher price since they are taxed 
on the average of prices from the first day of the month preceding delivery (here 1st March) 
and ending on the middle day of the month of delivery, (WPA, 1st June 1987). This reasoning 





























































































even at a discount to February cargoes. On 10 December 1987 (see Figure 2) a new price 
squeeze started, pushing the premium of first-month (January) over second-month (February) 
up to $ 1.37 within fifteen days. During the same time span the premium over first month 
WTI climbed to $ 1.66, while dated Brent remained at a discount of about 50 cents per barrel. 
It is only in the second week of January that dated cargoes were sold at a small premium. So 
the squeeze happened on the 15-Day market, not on the spot market.
Figures 3-6 give detailed evidence on the daily deals of the January 1988 squeeze as 
published by the Weekly Petroleum Argus!’ TWO is reported to have had control of almost 
all dated January cargoes in the second half of December (Around the 10th of January it also 
owned the majority of the remaining undated January cargoes). Intuition suggests that TWO 
built up its long position at a time other longs were selling. Figure 4 shows that the majority 
of trading took place in the first three weeks of November. On one particular day, more than 
50 deals were reported. This alone exceeds a month’s production. Since the second half of 
December, that is, once the dating of January cargoes started, almost no deals were reported. 
That is the period during which, supposedly, TWO squeezed by refusing to close the market’s 
open interest.
Figure 3 shows that the period of active trading in November was also a period of 
moderately decreasing prices. On a give day the differences in price for deals made were of 
moderate size reflecting a near concurrence on the expected spot price. Figures 5 and 6 show 
similar data for the February 1988 contract. This pattern of trade is typical for the 15-Day 
market. The important thing to note is that a squeezer can easily hide in this kind of data: The 
trading is decentralised and nobody keeps track of the traders’ positions, so the squeezer can 
quietly buy up contracts from different traders each of whom only has a moderately short 
position.
In the first week of January the premia were falling (See Figure 2). By the 11th of 
January the squeeze was over. The fall of the premia may have been related to some extent 
to Esso’s and Shell’s announcement that they would supply stocks from their corporate 
systems. At any rate, TWO had to take delivery of 41 out of the 42 cargoes produced in 
January and did not push the dated premium to high levels. 6




























































































Figure 3: The January 1988 contract
High/Low Price
O ct 1 O ct 15 O ct 29 Nov 12 Nov 26 Dec 10 Dec 24 Jan 11 
Source: W eekly Petro leum  Argue





























































































Figure 5: February 1988 contract
High/Low Price
Source: W eekly Petro leum  Argue





























































































It is worth noting that Esso in March 1988 proposed to its trading partners that sellers 
be given the option in the standard contract of substituting a number of other grades of crude 
oil from North Sea fields for Brent, in an attempt to deter a repetition of the squeeze. 
Substitution would incur a premium of 30 cents per barrel. Delivery options of this kind is 
the standard way of avoiding squeezes in futures markets (See Duffie (1989) pp. 323-4). After 
some discussion the proposal was not accepted. This alternative squeeze preventing proposal 
suggests that Esso had abandoned the idea that the main producers could deter squeezes by 
threatening to make stocks available.
Figure 7 shows how the differential between Platt’s, quotations of the average price 
of paper barrels for delivery in the first and second month evolved from 1987 to 1991. The 
six peaks that can be identified (marked I-VI) are potential candidates for squeezes and in fact 
five of them (I-IV and VI) were. The huge peak between V and VI was caused by the Gulf 
Crisis that led to a maximum differential of 3.1 $/bl on 17 September 1992. The maxima of 
the six potential squeezes are given in Table 1.
TABLE 1: Five Squeezes
Peak Date Maximum Differential Differential 
2nd Month
I 08/04/87 1.60 $/bl 8.9 %
II 31/12/87 1.37 S/bl 8.1 %
III 03/08/89 0.75 $/bl 4.6 %
IV 06/11/89 1.53 $/bl 8.1 %
V'> 10/01/90 1.17 $/bl 5.8 %
VI 12/04/91 0.90 $/bl 4.7 %
1) Due to unexpectedly strong demand for heating oil, cfr. text.
The two first peaks (I and II) are the two squeezes that were mentioned above and 
they both led to price surges that reached maxima of more than eight percent (measured as 
the differential over second month price7). The third and fourth squeezes were supposedly 
carried out either by a Wall Street refiner or by a trading house. Weekly Petroleum Argus





































































































































































































"The premium for November 15-Day Brent over December widened from 40 tf/bl between 
Friday morning and Thursday evening.
This premium has talked wider all week [27/10 - 2/11/89] but in such secrecy that it appeared an 
attempt to force up the November quotations and price reporting services felt manipulated. 
However both numbers given above were confirmed and there is conjecture that one party sold 
short in expectation that the spread would close in. But it was eventually forced to cover at almost 
double the premium at which it bought [sold?]". (Weekly Petroleum Argus, 6/11/89 p. 8)
And: "... The price of North Sea crude is blurred by the pressure on November Brent which some feel
is rubbing off on December prices. The possibility that an extra Brent cargo may be fitted into the 
November programme helped reduce November prices slightly but they remain out of line with the 
rest of the market. The monthly recurrence of so called squeezes since the summer, partly due to 
the reduction in Brent production, is angering traders who feel the future of the 15-Day market in 
jeopardy. ... (Weekly Petroleum Argus 13/11/89 p. 8).
The quotes show two important effects of a squeeze: first, a market participant that 
for speculative reasons was taking a short position had to cover at a large loss; and second, 
market participants are getting discontent with the market because of squeezes. Furthermore 
it shows that the possible availability of an additional cargo reduced the effect of the squeeze. 
These observations constitute a crucial part of our modelling of the market in Section 2.
V was as mentioned not a squeeze. This can be seen from the fact that spot prices 
raised even more than first month prices, and the cause of this was an increase in the demand 
for heating oil. Platt’s Oilgram Price Report of 2/1/90 noted:
"... With Brent now turning wet into the second-half of Jan, and with the absence of any squeeze- 
related play in Jan Brent, paper and wet Brent are acting in unison."
Thus there seems to be general agreement that this was not a squeeze.
VI was a squeeze that was carried out by a large, Chinese trading house. The story 
was however not commented by the Weekly Petroleum Argus, nor by any other commentator 
that we know of and we are relying on confidential information in this case.
Summing up, we have identified five major squeezes in the 15-Day market for Brent 
crude oil in the period 1987 - 1991. The immediate effect of squeezes is that some market 
participants incur losses out of line with normal speculative gains and losses. The long-run 
effect is that market participants are worried to a degree where they feel that the future of the 
entire market is at stake. Finally, if extra cargoes (read: regulatory stocks) were available, the 




























































































2. A Squeezer Round the Corner?
In this section we propose a model that captures the ideas that were presented above. 
We first model how the squeeze affects the market and what it costs to prevent a squeeze 
given that the producers can cooperate on holding regulatory stocks. We then move on to 
determining under what circumstances such regulatory stocks can be sustained in a non- 
cooperative repeated game.
Two points should be borne in mind throughout. The paper is about regulatory stocks, 
and that only. This means that the only reason to hold stocks is a potential squeeze. In 
particular, the producers face no other uncertainty than that arising from the squeeze so buffer 
stocks are ruled out; the price that the producers receive is constant before and after a squeeze 
so speculative stocks are ruled out; the marginal cost of production is constant (zero) so there 
is no incentive to hold transaction stocks; the time horizon is infinite so strategic stocks in 
the sense of Mpllgaard and Phlips (1992) are not an issue either.
The second point is that in this framework production always equals sales except in 
the period where a squeeze occurs in which case sales equal production plus stocks.
2.1 The Squeezer’s Game
We ignore the presence of integrated oil companies and assume that the market 





The final demand for crude oil arises from the refineries, who buy the crude on the 
spot market. The producers hedge their entire production by selling it forward. The traders 
serve as intermediaries and buy forward from the producers to sell on the spot market. Thus, 
to simplify matters, we assume that the spot market consists of refineries, traders and possibly 
a squeezer, whereas the forward market consists of producers, traders and possibly a squeezer. 
Section 3 comments on the fact that integrated oil companies operate in the market.
Assume that the refineries’ demand for crude oil takes a form that allows us to write 





























































































P, = (âr RP) - x, , 0)
where a  ~ N (af v) with a, > 0 and RP is some positive constant to be determined later. We 
have E(P) a P t = a  -  RP -  x t P, can be thought of as the "market expectation" of the spot
price. Traders are risk-averse profit maximisers. In particular their utility function may be 
negatively exponential in profits (u (ji)  = - e A") implying, since ji follows a normal distribution, 
that they maximise E(n) - AVar(n)/2. Their expected payoff is thus
where A is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion and d is the net long 
position of the trader (d for "deals"). A trader’s participation constraint is thus:
As long as the participation constraint holds with inequality, there are payoffs to be made 
from trading in forward contracts, so the market should attract more traders implying that the 
forward price p, be competed up to equality of (3). But this argument holds for a fixed d and 
the right hand side of (3) is minimised for d = 1 (given that a deal is indivisible and that d 
> 0), so it is in the interest of the producers to have at least as many traders in the market 
as the number of deals so that each of the traders buy one forward contract from the 
producers. Seen from the producers point of view, the risk premium they have to pay - the 
cost of hedging - is decreasing in the number of traders in the market.8 Note that (3)
8 A similar point is made in Working (1953). See especially the section entitled "The Cost 
of Hedging".
dtp, -  p )  -  d 2̂ -VarPt - d(P[ - p t -  d^-V), (2)






























































































basically assumes a situation of normal backwardation in which the producers are so risk 
averse that they hedge completely. Given their (now certain) demand curve, they can go on 
and maximise profits in the usual way.
Equality of the constraint (3) with d = 1 implies that the producers face a certain 
demand function on the forward market of the simple form:
p -  P  - RP = a  - x .*1 l I I (4)
In this subsection we assume that the producers can sustain a cooperative outcome in 
a non-cooperative repeated game (which we then study in Section 2.2). We also assume that 
the marginal cost of production is constant and normalise it to zero. The n producers therefore 













The model above can explain a volume of trade on the forward market equal to the 
volume of production and it does not allow for squeezes since all traders are net long. As a 
matter of fact, the volume of trade on the 15-Day forward market is typically ten-fold the 
volume of production and squeezes do occur. It is argued elsewhere (see Mpllgaard (1992)) 
that the volume on the forward market can be explained predominantly by speculation, 
implying that'different traders enjoy different spot price expectations. This also explains why 
some traders short-sell contracts and thus how a squeezer can build up a large long position. 
We shall not pursue the issue of speculation here, but note that it may reduce the traders’ 
aversion to risk that the market is liquid (has a high volume), since they can then free 
themselves from whatever contract they have engaged in at any time incurring a moderate 




























































































The implicit assumption that we make and - more importantly - that the traders make, 
is that the market’s open interest at maturity is cleared by financial transactions using the spot 
price which is determined by the (known) production and the realisation of the refineries’ 
demand curve (1). The traders do not expect a squeeze.
A squeezer is indistinguishable from a normal trader. The squeezer uses imperfections 
in the clearing of the forward market strategically to squeeze a temporary profit out of the 
markets. As menitioned, the volume in the forward market is bigger than the volume of the 
spot market, but the difference is normally closed by financial transactions in a bookout or 
a daisy chain as maturity approaches. However, in the 15-Day market, no participant is legally 
obliged to enter in the clearing and the squeezer uses this opportunity to squeeze the market: 
By offering a price in the high end of the spectrum, the squeezer obtains legal rights to a 
substantial part if not all of the physical cargoes. Those who sold cargoes forward without 
having them (everybody but the producers) and who therefore are genuinely short of oil are 
put in a difficult situation: they have to buy either on the spot market thereby crowding out 
the usual buyers or take the squeezer’s terms on the forward market. This idea is modelled 
by assuming that a squeeze of size a s equal to the open interest of the market at maturity 
affects the inverse demand in the following way:
( 6)
Pt -  a. - a ' - x RP ' -  p t -  (a? -  RP ') ; a ' > ft
Here the assumption is that if the traders have to buy up paper cargoes on the forward 
market (from the squeezer) at a premium in order to satisfy their contractual obligations, they 
reduce their own risk premium (that may become negative):
R P ’ -  RP -  a ' (7)
In this case we say that the squeeze was entirely on the 15-day market, since we will note a 
price surge only on the 15-day market as the traders close their positions.




























































































market. This will raise the spot price by a s and will in the end have the same effect on 
traders’ profits, but this time the spot price is affected and so we say that the squeeze is on 
the spot market. Indeed, it is this possibility of buying spot oil that puts a limit on the terms 
that the squeezer can set if the squeeze is settled in terms of paper cargoes. One could, of 
course, imagine a combination: the squeeze could be settled partly in paper barrels and partly 
in wet barrels, but this does not affect the analysis. Note that, since the producers sold their 
entire production forward, their immediate profit is not affected.
To summarise: Within each period t, the producers first sell their production on the 
forward market to the traders. Some traders also sell forward contracts to other traders 
expecting financial settlement at maturity. The squeezer possibly buys a substantial number 
of forward contracts. Then the spot market opens. If the squeezer does not show up, those 
who bought forward from the producers clear the spot market with the refineries, and the 
resulting spot price is used in financial settlements of the remaining open interest on the 
forward market. If the squeezer does show up, short traders may appear on the spot market 
in desperate search for a possibility to fulfil their legal obligation. This would drive up the 
spot price. Alternatively, the short traders may seek a settlement with the squeezer on the 
forward market and this would drive up forward prices.
In the normal mode of functioning there is a friendly competitive environment on the 
forward market: friendly meaning that the imperfections of the clearing mechanism are not 
exploited in a squeezing game. When a squeeze occurs, an aggressive environment results: 
the imperfections of the clearing mechanism are exploited, traders and/or refiners are trapped 
and have to pay more for the crude oil than they expected and thus observe reduced expected 
profits or even losses.
A successful squeeze therefore results in a general dissatisfaction among the refiners 
or the intermediaries because of the malfunctioning and unpredictability of the market. They 
will tend to organise trade outside the market or in other markets or they get more averse to 
risk. After all, the squeeze proved that spot prices were more volatile than they thought 
initially and so a higher risk premium is required.
We assume (for simplicity of notation) that when a successful squeeze occurs, a s 
squeezed refineries leave the market in the next period to never come back if the squeeze 
occurs on the spot market, or if the squeeze is on the forward market that the traders require 




























































































thing to note is that in all periods following a squeeze, the producers are left with a demand 
curve with an intercept that is as lower. The inverse demand curve in all periods following 
a squeeze is:
P, i = «,./ " X,., = (a, - a') - xM (8)
The producers thus have a long-run incentive to prevent a squeeze in order to keep 
the price of their hedged production from falling in the future; to keep the market liquid. They 
can achieve this by keeping stocks in order to match a squeeze if it occurs, i.e. by keeping 
stocks 5 = a '. The idea is that if the squeezer squeezes, then the producers throw their stocks 
on the market at the normal price to meet the artificially created demand. In a sense, the 
producers always keep a physical position of size a '  to match the squeezer’s long paper 
position. We assume that the cost of storage is the interest r per S per barrel per period.
If they hold stocks to prevent a squeeze, i.e. s = a ‘, they have to subtract the interest 
on the value of the stocks r a ’p, from revenue in each period and reoptimising we find that 












-  r a 5 
2
-  ra* ,
(9)
Profit: Tit = (
2 *
If they fail to prevent a squeeze in period t (not holding stocks), profits will be 
(a,-a*)2/4 in all future periods instead of (a,/2)2 The discounted loss of not preventing a 
squeeze is therefore




where we assume a discount rate of 11(1 +r) and that the effect of a squeeze in period i 




























































































is that the producers’ output is inflexible in period t so that production is decided upon before 
the squeezer reveals himself. Additional supply therefore has tocome from the stocks if they 
exist. These stocks are supposedly made available immediately.
The price in case of a successful squeeze is the price of equation (6) taking the 
monopoly output as given:
so a price surge of size a ' will occur on the forward market towards maturity if the squeeze 
is happening there or on the spot market if that is where the squeeze pops up.
The (gross) payoff of a squeeze to the squeezer is the size of his long position, cxs, 
times the price difference between selling and buying, p ‘, - p, = a s, i.e. (as)2. In the case of 
a squeeze, the squeezer has to dispose of the acquired oil elsewhere and he therefore suffers 
a loss, 0 , of squeezing independently of whether the squeeze is successful or not.
The payoffs are summarised in Table 2. The producers’ payoff are reported as
deviations from an eternal monopoly profit, with the value ((r-l)/r)(a2J4) today.
The producers’ entry in the lower, right corner of the matrix is due to the assumption 
that if the squeezer squeezes and if the producers sell their stocks, the squeezer cannot 
squeeze again since he has now been identified as such and so the producers do not need to
Table 2: Payoff Matrix for Squeezer vs. Producers
Squeezer\Producers No stocks Stocks=as
No squeeze (0,0) \
(1 -r)as(2ai -ras)
l '  4
Squeeze ((as)2-0  ,
(2 a - a s)a s





























































































hold stocks any longer. On the other hand, the producers earn an additional profit («'/;,) from 
satisfying the extra demand the squeezer has created.
There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: if the producers do not carry stocks 
the squeezer will squeeze; if the squeezer squeezes, the producers will cany stocks; but then 
the squeezer will not squeeze and thus it does not pay for the producers to carry stocks.
Letting stocks be a continuous variable allows s to take a value above zero but below 
a '. What happens if s takes an internal value? In the case of a squeeze, a number of the 
squeezed traders can fulfil their obligation by buying the producers stocks at price p, and 
delivering to the squeezer. This modifies the squeeze to one of size (af-s) and thus affects 
prices by (as-s) and so the squeezer’s profit, A(s), becomes a quadratic function of the stocks:
A(s) -  (as -  s)2 - © ___ (12)
A(s) = 0 ‘» s = s = a s - \ 0
Observe that the squeezer’s profit takes the value zero for s=s < a ' if the cost. 0 , of 
squeezing is strictly positive. The square root of 0  translates the cost of squeezing into an 
equivalent number of cargoes. The presence of a cost of squeezing thus means that by 
keeping stocks equal to a ’ the producers commit overkill, since stocks are costly and a
squeeze will be unprofitable even if stocks are reduced by \ 0  .
Now we exogenise the squeezer and assume that the producers perceive that there is 
an exogenous probability, a, of a squeeze of size a ’ in each period. This means that the 
producers do not try to influence the squeezers behavior strategically, but that they rather 
observe the possibility of a squeeze and take it into account.
We choose a simple model of a squeeze probability: Assume that there is probability 
a  of a squeeze until the squeeze has occurred (if ever) whereafter the squeezer is identified 
and a squeeze cannot occur again.
Production can be changed from period to period and before a squeeze occurs it is 
chosen to maximise expected single period profit:
£ (II/x ;a i,o,r,.v)) = (1 -  a)(at -  x)(x - rs) * o («  - x)(x -  s) . (13)
The first term says that if a squeeze does not occur (an event that happens with probability 
1-ci), stocks are held in vain and the producers have to pay the cost of storage, prs. The 




























































































of the stocks at the going price.
The equilibrium that obtains before a squeeze is therefore
/
5k II
P = ^ (a , -  Ys) (14)
E(W) = L (a , -  is)2
where y = a  - (1 -  a)r .
If y > 0, i.e. if a  > —— , then the quantity is lower and the price is higher than in the 
1 -r
situation in which a squeeze cannot occur, see (5). Conversely if y < 0.
In the period after a squeeze, i.e. once uncertainty has been resolved, production is 
chosen to maximise
n  (x;af a',.v) -  (a ( -  a ' - s -  x )x t , (IS)
since the new demand intercept is
a  . - a ( -  (a? - s) , Vi > 0 . (16)
The solution that obtains after a squeeze is therefore


































































































[<1 -a)2E(U) - a ( l -(1 ~a))U 1
1
(1 ~r)3
1(1 -a)3E (n )  -  o (l -(1 -o) -(1 7
(18)
— E ( n j  -  —— n  .
o -r  r o -r
The first term in the square brackets multiplies the probability that a squeeze has not occurred 
up to a certain period with the expected stage game profit before a squeeze. The second term 
similarly multiplies the cumulated probability that a squeeze happened in a given period or 
before with the after-squeeze profits.
For later convenience, define
K(s;afa\o,r) = 4/E<T1J - i l l l  / 
r
-  fa, -  vs)2 -  ilfa, -  a' -  s)2 
r
(19)
and observe that K  is proportional to E(Jl) and that these expressions therefore enjoy the same 
functional characteristics.




























































































Assumption 1: The interest rate is positive, r > 0 , and o  is a probability, Le. a  E
m i
Assumption 2: a, > a s > 0.
Assumption 3 : 0 s s s a ‘.
Assumption 1 is hardly controversial. Assumption 2 is a joint assumption: Firstly it 
means that a squeeze raises prices by two hundred percent at the most, which does not seem 
restrictive given the size of the squeezes reported in Table 1. Secondly it implies that the 
market does not vanish completely in the periods following a squeeze if the squeeze is 
completely unprevented (s = 0) so that the problem is still well defined after a squeeze. 
Assumption 3 requires stocks to be non-negative and not to exceed a s. (If s > a s, a ltl = a, - 
(a ’ - s) > a, which is not a tenable assumption.)
Let s’ denote optimal stocks. We immediately get the result that if a squeeze is totally 
unlikely to occur, it does not pay to hold stocks:
Proposition 1 (Certainly No Squeeze): a  = 0 => s’ = 0.
Proof: K(s;a„a’,0,r) = (a, - rs)2 takes a global minimum = 0 for s = a jr  >
0. K(s) is real valued and continuous in s. The restriction of K(s) to [0;a'j 
therefore takes a maximum on this set. K  is convex in s and the maximum thus 
is at s = 0 or s = a*. K(0;a„a\0,r) = a] > K(as;apa ’,0,r) = (a, - a'r)2 if a,
> a'r/2. But if a 'r/2  > a„ the corresponding price is negative, which does not 
make economic sense.■
Remark: Given Assumption 2, non-negativity of prices is only an issue for 
interest rates above 200 per cent. More general comments about non-negativity 




























































































Proposition 2: A sufficient condition for s’ = a ’ is o  > r_ .
Proof: o  > r => y > 0 => > 0 ,Vj => A"(a') > K(0)M
1 ~r ds
Remark 1: An equivalent formulation of Proposition 2 has r < ----- => s ' - a*.
7 -a
Remark 2: is the inverse of the present value of an eternal sequence of 7’s. In other
words, the condition in Proposition 2 compares the risk of a squeeze with time preferences. 
Corollary (Certain Squeeze): a  = 1 => s‘ = a \
Proof: Trivial: r < 1 , Vr a 0 .0
1 -r
The necessary and sufficient conditions for s’ = a '  and the complementary conditions 
for s = 0 are given in Proposition 3 of the Appendix. It is clear from the proof of Proposition 
3 that the maximum must be obtained at s = 0 or at s = a* since K  is convex in .v and since 
the domain is restricted to [0;a']. Here we just indicate in Figure 8 the values of the 
parameters a  and r for which the necessary and sufficient conditions will always be fulfilled, 
where they can never be fulfilled and where the restrictions on a ! and a, compared to a  and 
r are effectively binding. We have here chosen what we consider a normal range for r, 
namely r G [0;0.5]. We think of our basic unit of time as one month, and month-to-month 
interest rates very rarely exceed fifty per cent. The conclusion is that only for small squeeze- 
probabilities and (very) high interest rates is it the case that a monopoly will not hold stocks.
To give an idea of the content of the Appendix, let it suffice to be said that the
parameter space is four dimensional and for each vector (af a s,r,a)E R lx[0;l]  it is possible 




























































































Figure 8: Regions of the Parameter Space
a
be expressed in terms of an inequality relating (as/a j  to some function of a  and r, and so the
as
problem is reduced to three dimensions: (— ,o,r)E[0;l]2x R  , where we have used
a t





























































































(20)v (a ,r )l1  ^ fi(o ,r) > 0 ,
where the functional forms of n  and v are given in the Appendix. Zero stocks are preferred 
whenever the inequality is reversed.
This finalises the discussion of the profitability of stocks given that the producers 
cooperate. We now turn to a discussion of whether such cooperative outcomes is sustainable 
in a non-cooperative repeated game featuring squeezes and regulatory stocks.
2.2 The Producers’ Repeated Game
It is well known from the literature on repeated games with observed actions that 
cooperative outcomes can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games, this 
leading to payoffs over and above the equilibrium payoffs of the stage game, cf. for an early 
example Friedman (1971). These results are known as 'folk theorems’ and roughly maintain 
that any outcome that all players prefer to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game can be a 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if the interest rate is sufficiently low. The 
cooperative behaviour is sustained by the threat to revert to the Nash equilibrium of the stage 
game if a deviation occurs and play this equilibrium forever after. This punishment strategy 
is in itself (trivially) subgame perfect and thus a credible threat to lower the payoff of the 
deviator (and everybody else) in all periods following the deviation. If a potential deviator 
cares sufficiently about future payoffs, i.e. if she has a sufficiently high discount rate or a 
correspondingly low interest rate, then deviation is deterred by the threat. The deviator 
compares the immediate gain from deviating with the discounted loss from the eternal 
punishment starting the following period. There will be a threshold of the interest rate such 
that for all values above it, cooperation cannot be sustained. The questions that are treated in 
this section are whether a duopoly would hold stocks and how this and the possibility of a 
squeeze affect the scope for cooperation.
The analysis of the «-firm oligopoly case in which a squeeze may occur and stocks 
can be held follows similar considerations but gets somewhat more intricate because the 




























































































Before a squeeze, the firms’ profits are
EfUJs)) = (1 ~a)(a, -  x)(xu - rs) -  of a  -  x,)(x, -  s)
= fa, - *,)(•*,, * • * = l,2 ,-,n
(21)
where x: = ,, s, is firm i’s stock (.v = 5~^s:), and equilibrium profits turn out to be
a, + ys 
, n-1
, V/.
After a squeeze, maximised profits are
n .
V




where we have used that the demand intercept equals a , - fa1 - s) after a squeeze of size a * 
that was met with sales, s, of stocks.
Importantly we get
Proposition 7: In equilibrium, the profits of the producers in «-firm oligoply do not depend 
on their share of overall stocks (i.e. on s,), only on the level of overall stocks, s.
Proof: Examination of (22) and (23) reveals that the expected profit before a
squeeze and the profit after a squeeze depend on s but not on s,. V
Proposition 7 means that if non-cooperative oligopolists agree that a certain level of 
stocks would be optimal to (partially) prevent a squeeze, then it does not matter whether they 
split the stocks equally or whether, say, one of them holds all stocks. This is so, because in 
equilibrium (before a squeeze) prices are set to balance the cost of holding stocks with the 




























































































Furthermore, the producers will agree on the optimal level of stocks and that level will 
coincide with that of the monopolist:
Proposition 8: In equilibrium, a certain level of stocks, s, is optimal to a non-cooperating 
oligopolist if and only if it is optimal for the monopolist.
Proof: Expected, discounted profits are
E(U ) = 1 -r 1 
a -r  (n-1)2
(«, -  ys)2 a ,  , . 2-  _ (a , -  a' -  sy 
r
= ------------- K (s; a . a 5, o,r), V i
a-r(n-l)2 '
but K(s) was exactly the function used to determine optimality of s for the 
monopoly (see (19)).M
Remark: For a given s, single firm oligopoly profit is the fraction (2l(n + l))2 (n a 1) of the 
monopoly profit both in the short run (stage game) and in the long run (expected discounted 
profit).
Proposition 8 means that the oligopoly will hold either zero stocks or stocks equal to 
a \  depending on the values of r and cr and possibly also of a7a„  exactly as would the 
monopoly, so Figure 8 and the analysis in the Appendix can be applied without modification.
The question that now comes to mind is whether the possibility of a squeeze and the 
ability to hold stocks change the firms’ incentive to deviate by increasing production. It does 
and quite significantly so. Observe that the profits mentioned in the proof of Proposition 8 
are the result of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Thus if a deviator deviates from a 
situation of cooperation at time t, she will expect these profits from t+1. Since the discount 
rate is ll(l+ r), the discounted value at l is (a+r) '(n+l)’2K(s). This is the threat that may or 
may not prevent deviation, depending on s, a \  a„ a  and r.
To get a bench-mark, firstly consider the standard model without the complications 





























































































(n -lr  1 - m 'r > ------ !_— _  = ------------
(n+1)2 j m - 1
4n
C0(n), (24)
where m = (n -l)2/(4n). The critical value of r, C0(n), decreases from .89 for n -  2 to .49 for 
n = 6 to .33 for n=10, as also seen in Table 3.











In 1984 the concentration in the market for Brent has been calculated to correspond 
to 4.4 equal sized firms as measured by the inverse of the Herfindahl index (see Mabro 
(1986) pp. 40-45). The similar numbers for the British part of the North Sea and for the entire 




























































































British National Oil Corporation has been abolished and the Brent Blend has been redefined 
to include oil from other fields. Both of these events tended to decrease concentration 
(increase the equivalent number of equal sized firms) and for this reason, we have set n = 6 
in the ensuing analysis. Note that a too high n tend to favour a non-cooperative outcome by 
lowering the critical value whereas a too low n has the opposite effect. The degree to which 
the critical value is over- or undervalued is indicated by Table 3. The critical value C„(6) = 
24/49 = .49 can be thought of as a benchmark in the following.
Now consider the incentive to deviate starting from a situation where a monopolist 
(and an oligopoly) would choose 5  = 0. In this case, we require 5 , = 0 for all firms and 
assume that each firm produces 2/n’th of the monopoly output. There is an incentive to 
deviate if
B - \ B 2 -  4 a k2(m -l)2/mr > ---------1---------------------------
2(m -l)
C(o.k.n:s=0), (25)
where B = ma - ok2 - 1 + 1/m and where k = _ i----  is the percentage of the market that
a ,
remains after a squeeze. Critical values for r, C(a,k,n=6; s = 0) are found in Table 4 below. 
It is seen that the possibility of an unprevented squeeze reduces the scope for cooperation 
unless either the probability or the size of the squeeze is zero (k = 1). It is not surprising that 
the first row of Table 4 falls rapidly to zero as a  increases, since a possible squeeze of size 
a ' = a, eats away the entire market and all future profits. In the last row, the size of the 
squeeze is zero and its probability does not matter, wherefore we get the no-squeeze critical 
value of 24/49. The same applies for the first column where the probability is zero and the 
size does not matter. In all other cases, the value is lower than the benchmark value of 0.49. 
For a given size of the squeeze (a given k), the critical value of r falls dramatically as the 
probability of the squeeze increases - more so for big squeezes (small k’s) than for small 
ones. Similarly, for a given probability of a squeeze, the critical value falls off rapidly as the 
size of the squeeze gets bigger (k goes from 1 to 0).




























































































TABLE 4: Critical Values for r, s = 0, n = 6.
k I a 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0 0.49 0.098 0 0 0 0
0.1 0.49 0.109 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003
0.2 0.49 0.135 0.026 0.017 0.015 0.014
0.3 0.49 0.168 0.056 0.039 0.034 0.031
0.4 0.49 0.205 0.095 0.071 0.062 0.057
0.5 0.49 0.246 0.143 0.112 0.099 0.093
0.6 0.49 0.289 0.199 0.164 0.148 0.139
0.7 0.49 0.335 0.261 0.228 0.210 0.200
0.8 0.49 0.384 0.331 0.303 0.287 0.277
0.9 0.49 0.436 0.407 0.390 0.380 0.372
1 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
LEGEND TO TABLES 4 & 5: The tables show the critical value C(a,r, n=6 ; s) for the 
interest rate: if r is greater than the value in a cell, there is an incentive to deviate and 
cooperation can not be sustained, k is the percentage of the market that would be left after
a  -a 1




























































































TABLE 5: Critical Values for r, s = a \  n = 6.
k \ a 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0 0.49 (1.95) 0.366 0.200 0.129 0.093
0.1 0.49 (2.12) 0.380 0.217 0.143 0.103
0.2 0.49 (2.32) 0.395 0.236 0.159 0.117
0.3 0.49 0.682 0.409 0.258 0.179 0.133
0.4 0.49 0.614 0.422 0.282 0.202 0.153
0.5 0.49 0.577 0.435 0.309 0.229 0.178
0.6 0.49 0.551 0.448 0.339 0.262 0.210
0.7 0.49 0.531 0.459 0.373 0.303 0.251
0.8 0.49 0.515 0.470 0.409 0.353 0.306
0.9 0.49 0.501 0.480 0.448 0.414 0.382
1 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
LEGEND TO TABLE 5: The incentive to deviate describes a fourth-degree polynomial in r, 
which typically (but not always) have one negative and three positive roots. The numbers in 
Table 5 are the lowest of the positive roots. Numbers in parentheses correspond to the third 





























































































this value of a  and for all r between 0 and 1.3973,9 that is for interest rates up to 139.73 
per cent, the oligopolists should hold stocks, s = a s, according to the necessary and sufficient 
conditions and in this case Table 5 is the one to look at. In Table 5 the critical value is found 
to be C(0.5,0.5,n = 6; s = a j  = 0.435, so that the duopolists should cooperate if the (month- 
to-month) interest rate does not exceed 43.5 per cent.
If s = a ', the producers will deviate iff
The first term is the deviators expected profit in the period in which deviation takes place. 
The second term is the discounted value of the ensuing sequence of non-cooperative profits. 
The r.h.s. is 1/n’th of expected discounted monopoly profits. (26) with equality describes a 
fourth degree polynomial in r (remember that y is a function of a  and r) where there 
generally is one negative root and possibly three positive roots. A general analytical solution 
to (26) was not found and numerical methods were applied to generate Table 5, which gives 
the first (lowest) positive root with n = 6. For interest rates above the first positive root and 
below the second, cooperation cannot be sustained, but if the interest rate is between the 
second and the third positive root cooperation is again sustainable. For interest rates above 
the third positive root deviation is to be expected again. Only the first positive root is tabled 
here since the second and the third root both are well above 1. As an example take k = 0.5, 
a  = 0.4 and n = 6. Then the first positive root is 0.435 as seen in Table 5, the second is 
2.698 and the third is 4.948.
In Table 5, the critical value of r is seen to vary much more with o  than with k: the 
size of a squeeze attempt matters less now that it is prevented.
Comparing Tables 4 and 5, it can be concluded that for all probabilities and all sizes 
of the squeeze, the case for cooperation is stronger with than without stocks. This follows 
partly from the fact that K(0) < K(as) for most of the reported values of o  unless r is very 
high, so that future profits are worth more with than without stocks. In fact, if the interest rate 
is below the critical values in Table 5 (ignoring the a  = 0 column), then in all but five cases





























































































the oligopolists should hold stocks. The five cases are the five first entries of the a  = 0.2 
column. In these cases, if r < 0.5196,'° producers will hold stocks and will cooperate. The 
general conclusion from this analysis is that if the producers cooperate, they should also hold 
stocks. In a few cases this conclusion is reversed: if they hold stocks, they should also 
cooperate.
A caveat is appropriate here: Table 5 and inequality (26) are only valid in the 
completely symmetric case where the producers produce 1/n’th of monopoly output and hold 
1/n’th of the stocks each. Only if the latter is also the case will each producer’s expected 
profit be 1/n’th of expected monopoly profit. At first sight this may seem at odds with 
Proposition 7. This, however is not the case: Proposition 7 describes a situation of Nash 
equilibrium in the stage game, whereas (26) describes the incentive to deviate from the 
cooperative scenario. Under the restriction that the n firms’ stocks sum to a 5, the asymmetric 
case adds the following term to the right hand side of (26):
1 l - r
2 a -r
(a, - ycx*) (27)
sD is the potential deviator’s stock. (27) is the effect on cooperation of asymmetric stocks. If 
the effect is negative, deviation is more likely to occur. The term in the square brackets can 
be shown to be positive for all values of sD between 0 and a ',10 1 12so the effect shares the sign 
with (sD - a s/n): If a producer holds sD < a ’In, he is less likely to cooperate, whilst a producer 
that holds sD > a'/n is more likely to do so. In particular, if one producer holds all of the 
stocks, he is less likely to deviate but all the other producers would be more inclined to do 
so. Whether they would in fact do so, depends on k, a , r and n.'1
Deviating by increasing production may not be an issue in the Brent market, where 
one producer (Shell UK) is in charge of organising liftings (see Phlips (1992)). A production
10 r such that a 4(r) = 0.2.
11 We assume that the price is positive so a, + yet8 > 0. Then note that y s  1 and (n- 
l)/(4n) < 1/4 for all n 2  1. The second, negative term takes its minimum for sD = a s, but for 
this value it is a matter of manipulation to show that the entire expression is positive.




























































































schedule is compiled well ahead of time and is negotiated and approved by the other 
producers. Production is thus "observed before it happens" and the response to a deviation 
could therefore be simultaneous rather than delayed a period, thus further discouraging 
deviation.
The overall conclusion of Section 2 is that unless the probability of a squeeze is very 
small or the (month-to-month) interest rate very high, self-regulation by means of squeeze­
preventing stocks should be possible.
3. Conclusions and Extensions
The first four squeezes mentioned in Section 1 (see Table 1) occurred within a time 
range of three years (1987 - 1989), i.e. thirty six months. A crude estimate of a  in this period 
is therefore 4/36 = 1/9 = 0.11. For there to be any doubt that the producers should hold 
stocks to prevent the effects of a squeeze, the (month-to-month) interest rate should have been 
at least 33 pet. according to Proposition 4 of the Appendix.13 According to the sufficient 
condition (see remark to Proposition 2), r < (1/9)1(819) = 0.125 is a sufficient condition for 
s ' = a '. This condition was definitely met in the mentioned period. (A 12.5 pet. monthly 
interest rate corresponds to an interest rate of approximately 310 pet. on a yearly basis). So 
why did the producers not introduce regulatory stocks (or other squeeze-preventing 
mechanisms, for that matter)?
One partial answer is that they actually did release some cargoes in the December 
1987 squeeze and a single cargo in the November 1989 squeeze was potentially made 
available, but these efforts were far from efficient - they "failed to prevent a serious distortion 
from developing in the spectrum of oil prices".
Another answer may be that the model may favour the incentive to keep stocks (or 
the model may be correct, but the producers do not realise this).
One feature of the model that may seem too strong is the assumption that (a ’ - s) 
market participants (namely the squeezed traders/refineries) leave the market immediately 
after a squeeze has occurred. In reality, they might leave (or reduce the amount traded) 
gradually over time because it takes time for traders to develop other markets to work in or 
for refineries to find other crudes to substitute Brent. It may also very well be that the market




























































































participants get uptight about the market immediately after a squeeze and contemplate to leave 
it for a while, but then relax and continue trading. Indeed, it seems boundedly rational that 
the same company can squeeze twice within eight months: the traders, knowing the squeezer 
from the first squeeze, should think that trading with him again may well mean trouble. At 
any rate, if the producers think that the market will not lose "customers", their incentive to 
assuage the effects of a squeeze is of course non-existent.
On the other hand, the increasing popularity of the International Petroleum Exchange 
(IPE) of London may be a response to the malfunctioning of the 15-Day market. The IPE 
trades futures in units of 1.000 barrels of Brent blend, i.e. 1/500’th of the size of the 15-Day 
contract. The IPE is a traditional futures market and thus features all the regulations you 
expect from such a market. The producers have traditionally favoured the 15-Day market - 
but maybe their customers more and more prefer to trade on the IPE?
Further to this, our model supposes that a squeeze can only happen once. It happens 
as mentioned frequently. Including this in the model would require a genuinely dynamic 
model (the demand intercept would be a non-increasing stochastic variable), but ceteris 
paribus our one-squeeze model would tend to underplay the role of stocks compared to a 
frequent-squeeze model.
Another feature of the model that may seem to favour stocks is the cost of storage. 
We have assumed that this cost only arises from the interest on the value of the stocks - what 
it costs to keep the crude off the market. In the real world, there may be substantial costs to 
keeping cargoes afloat or to renting tanks in Rotterdam. This would reduce the incentive to 
hold stocks. Stocks are furthermore used for a variety of other purposes, including strategic 
motives in games between the producers (on this, see Mollgaard and Phlips (1992)), and 
producers seem to be secretive about the size of their stocks. (Our model actually requires that 
the size of the stocks be common knowledge).
Finally, an argument that wheighs against self-regulation is that some major producers 
are part of integrated oil companies: Squeezes may hurt independent refineries without 
affecting integrated refineries. In the long run, this will reduce competition among refineries 
and benefit "survivors": the integrated companies.
The model presupposes that the size of a potential squeeze and the probability of a 
squeeze are known. In reality, there might be more uncertainty involved. Introducing 




























































































would not alter the conclusions qualitatively.
The real world is of course much more complex and dynamic than the model of 
Section 2: demand and interest rates vary with time; the producers do not form a symmetric 
oligopoly; integrated oil companies complicate matters further. However, it is our belief that 






























































































Duffie, D. (1989) Futures Markets, Prentice-Hall, London.
Friedman, J. (1971) "A Noncooperative Equilibrium for Supergames", Review o f Economic 
Studies, 38, pp. 1-12.
Mabro, R. et al. (1986) The Market for North Sea Crude Oil, Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mpllgaard, P. (1992) "Bargaining in a Speculative Forward Market", mimeo, European 
University Institute, Florence.
Mollgaard, P. and Phlips, L. (1992) "Oil Futures and Strategic Stocks at Sea” in L. Phlips and 
L.D. Taylor (eds.) Aggregation, Consumption and Trade, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht.
Phlips, L. (1992) "Oligopolistic Pricing of Crude Oil Futures" in Supplement to The Economic 
Record, 1992, Special Issue on Futures Markets edited by Jerome L. Stein and Barry A. Goss.
Waldmann, R. (1992) "Asymmetric Oligopoly", EUI Working Paper 92163, European 
University Institute, Florence.
Working, H. (1949) "The Investigation of Economic Expectations", American Economic 
Review 39 (3) (Papers and Proceedings), pp. 151-66.
Working, H. (1962) "New Concepts Concerning Futures Markets and Prices", American 




























































































Appendix: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions, Parameter Space and Non-Negativity
s ' designates optimal stocks.
Proposition 3: Necessary and sufficient conditions:
s ' -  a ’ •» v tf  -  n a i a 0.
s '  -  0 «> v tf  - fia t s  0, (A.l)
where v = y2r - a  and fi = 2(yr - a).
Proof: K(s) is globally convex in s:
= 2 ^ )  > 0, Wo,r > 0. (A.2)
Thus it suffices to compare the values of K(s) at the lower and at the upper bounds for s, i.e. 
K(0) and K(us). It is easily checked that
v a ' + fia, > 0 => K(a’) > K(0) => s' = a ’; and s' = a? => K(a’) a  K(0) => v a ‘ + «a, a  0.
v a ' + ua, < 0 => K(a') < K(0) =s> s ' = 0 ; and s ' = 0 => K(a') s  K(0) => va* + mu, s 0.
v tf  + fia, = 0 => AYa') = K(0) => {s' = 0 v s ' = a S}M
We state the following three lemmas without proof. (A parenthical remark on notation: a  = 
a(r) is taken to mean that (r,a) = (r,o(r)). Similarly, a  G ]a(r), a(r)[ is taken to mean that 
(r,a): a(r) < a  < a(r).
Lemma 1: {a -  o , V a  -  o j  v -  0, where
1 -  2 r2 - 2 r3 -  \1  -  4r2 -  4r3
2r(J + __________  (A.3)
1 -  2 r2 -  2 r3 -  \jl -  4 r2 -  4r3 
2r(l -  r)2




























































































Lemma 3: {a - a4
Lemma 4: o , > —
2 1
(See Figure A.1) 
Proof of Lemma 4:
1)  a2 >  r/(l+r):
=> 1 - 
=> 1 - 2 r2 - 2 r3
2) rl(l +r) > a4:
=» (1 -  r -  r 2)2
V a = a J  -  1, where
v
_2 ,3 _1  3 1 <- r - r  * — * r  -  r ~ r  -  r
_2____________\4___________________
r(l * rf (A.4)
1 1 i  2 1 4- r - r - — *r -  r - r  - r
_2____________ \ 4 __________________
r(l -  r)2
- —  > a 4 > a3 > a , > a 5 , Vr > 0.
r > 0
Vi - 4r2 -  J >0 
- Vi -  4r2 - > 2r2(7 - r)
r > 0
=  1 -  2r -  3r2 *. 2r3 -  r 4 > L  -  r - r 2 -  r 3 -r 4 = a
4
» 2 r -
= >  1 - r -  r 4 > <Ja
=> r 2(l + r) > - 1 - r ^ r 3 ~ \[a
=> r  ■ > a4 m  




























































































3) a4 > a 3:
Let b =f_ * - r
2 2
and c = a(l -  r




It is easily checked that
r>0 => c > b > 0 =t> \fc > v'i" => a 4 > a3 M
4) (7, > a,: Follows from expanding the expressions and cancelling terms.
5) o , > o5:
r > 0 => 1 - I 1I _
\l 4
1 2 1 4— -  r * r -  r r
\  4
1 -r 2 r2 -  ~ 2 r3 -  \j 1 - 4 r2 -  4r3 > -1 -  2r -  2 r3 -  2 L  -  r -  r 2 - r 3 * r 4
\  4

























































































































































































Proposition 4: Division of the Parameter Space (See Figure A.2)
Vo £  la 4; 1 /, s ' = a '. ( I )
Va E  ]a3;a j ,  ()< --<.1 o ( I I )
VaaO a ^ [a pa j ,  s" -  0. (HI)
VaaO a(E[0;oJ, Os. -— .̂ 1 <=> js ' -  a 1 <=> —  a -di
v
s '  - 0  «  JL s  -1 (IV)a
Proof: The proof follows the division (I, II, III and IV) of the Proposition.
(I) We divide this region of the parameter space into two sub-regions:
(I.a) a  E  [o4 ; rl(l+r)]
(I.b) a  e  [rt(l +r) ; 1],
In region (l.a), y < 0 , v < 0 , / x > 0  and - / t / v s i .  The necessary and sufficient condition 
(A.l) for stocks (i.e. s’ = a ')  becomes
But the left hand side is by Assumption 2 smaller than or equal to one and the r.h.s. greater 
than or equal to one so the condition is always met.
Region (I.b) is exactly the sufficient condition of Proposition 2.
(II) In this region we have y < 0, \  < 0, fi > 0 and 0 < - fi/v s  l  and so the necessary and 
sufficient condition is binding.
(III) We divide this region into two subregions:
a, v
(III.a) a  E  [a, ; o3] 























































































































































































(III.a): Here we have v <; 0, fi s  0 and the necessary and sufficient condition for s’ = a 1 
becomes
a ! « n__ < -H  < 0
a ( v
for v < 0 (off a ,)  and fi a 0 for v = 0 (on a,), both of which are impossible. So we have s’ 
= 0.
(Ill.b): In this region v > 0 , fi < 0 and - /r/'v a 1, so the necessary and sufficient condition 
for s' = cT is a7a , > -/t/v, which is impossible by Assumption 2.
(IV): v > 0 , u < 0 and O s -  fi/v s  1, so the necessary and sufficient condition for s’ = a* 
is a s/a, > -fi/v, which is binding. Note, however, that s' = a '  gives rise to a negative price, 
cf. below. ■
Remark: The reader may by now wonder what happened to a2. It is hidden in region (I.b):
V as 1: a(E[o2;l], v  > 0, u > 0 and v tf  //a j
will always hold true. For a  €E [r/(l+r); a2[ we have v < 0, // > 0 and -uN > 1 so the 
condition for s’ = a ’ is always satisfied.
Remark: The function -m/v = f(r,a) has singularities along a, and a 2, where v = 0. Fix r at, 
say, r = 3, and’ consider the function as a  goes from 0 to I (See Figure A.3): As a  goes from 
0 to a 5, f(3,a) goes from 2/3 to 1. As a  goes from o5 to a „  f(3,a) goes from 1 to co. As a  
goes from a , to a „  f(3,a) goes from -oc to 0. As a  goes from as to a4, f(3,a) goes from 0 to 

























































































































































































Proposition 5: Production is always positive. 
Proof:
x -  —(a, ys) > 0 <=> a  > ys a ,-a s  > -(1 - a)rs ,
but the l.h.s. is always positive and the r.h.s. always non-positive.l 
Lemma 5: V(a,r)(2[0,l]xR , y < -1:
y v
Proof: \l < -I «  a<L—L \  => {r\>0 ,/J. <0} 1 p_  < - _  <=> r| < yju
v n
2 - r - r 2
yr * 2 a  < 0 => y(yr -  2a) > 0 > -a  =*■ yji > r).
T ~1 r ‘But the condition was that a  < -----  < ---------  , which then proves sufficient.*
r-1 2 - r - r 2
Proposition 6: In region (IV) (i.e. {(a,r)E.[0;l]x[2;*>]: a  s  a5(r)}), s' = a '  implies a 
negative price.
Proof: By Proposition 5 we have that s’ > a ’ »  —  > . Non-negativity of prices
a , r)
p  = —(a  -  y a ’) > 0 =* —  < - L  (y <0). but by Lemma 5 we have -— < -Ü , so 
2 a. y Y Tl
.r a* uprices are negative if —  > .
a , T)
Remark: The reason for this oddity is that the expected sales less the expected real cost of 
storage become largely negative due to very high interest rates (r > 200 %) and very large 
stocks. Multiplied by a negative price, profits become positive. The choice of s = 0 always 
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